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NATURALISM
Geert Keil
Introduction
“We are all naturalists now,” declared Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) in 1922.1 A bold 
assertion then, it had come closer to the truth by the end of the century. During the 
course of the twentieth century, “naturalism” seems to have become a synonym for 
a respectable philosophical methodology. On the other hand, there are a number of 
distinguished philosophers who advise against paying too much attention to what they 
view as a long series of unsuccessful naturalistic endeavors. As Peter Geach (1916– ) 
has written:
When we hear of some new attempt to explain reasoning or language or 
choice naturalistically, we ought to react as if we were told someone had 
squared the circle or proved √2ˉˉ  to be rational: only the mildest curiosity is in 
order – how well has the fallacy been concealed?2
This clash of opinions is remarkable. For Geach, it goes without saying that the series 
of naturalistic approaches is a series of failures, whereas Sellars takes it for granted that 
we are all naturalists now.
 It appears that the parties are not talking about the same thing. Sellars described 
naturalism as “less a philosophical system than a recognition of the impressive impli-
cations of the physical and biological sciences.”3 This characterization is typical for 
naturalists from the first half of the century. John Dewey (1859–1952) described a 
naturalist as “one who has respect for the conclusions of natural science.”4 If this kind 
of respect suffices to be converted to naturalism, then one can easily accept Sellars’s 
view. It seems silly to deny or belittle the unprecedented success of the natural sciences 
since the Enlightenment. Or, in the words of Bouwsma, “Who then would not accept 
scientific method, and prefer to go to Babylon by candlelight? Scientific method is 
successful.”5 If the only alternatives to naturalism are obscurantism, superstition, and 
supernaturalism, then naturalism seems to be the only game in town in our scientific 
culture. Although there still exist enclaves of religiously motivated supernaturalism, 
particularly in the United States, naturalism has become the most forceful meta-
philosophical trend of the twentieth century.
NATUR ALISM
255
 When Geach takes any “new attempt to explain reasoning or language or choice 
naturalistically” to be doomed to failure, he has more specific and demanding tasks in 
mind. Sellars and Dewey give general vindications for the natural sciences, whereas 
Geach refers to specific projects of naturalization. Now, having respect for the natural 
sciences and their methods does not yet guarantee the success of specific naturalistic 
projects. When it comes to these projects, naturalism does not compete with obscu-
rantism and supernaturalism, but rather with well-established philosophical theories 
that purport to explain phenomena with the use of non-empirical methods. Some 
naturalists hold that non-empirical methods are unscientific. But if this were true, 
then, not only philosophy but also neither mathematics nor logic could contribute to 
our scientific picture of the world.
 The attractiveness of philosophical naturalism crucially hinges on the available 
alternatives. As long as naturalists confine themselves to selling their position as a 
bulwark against irrationality, obscurantism, and superstition, they insinuate that any 
kind of philosophy not committed to naturalism must be obscurantist.6
 So let us take a step back. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a naturalist as 
“one who studies natural, in contrast to spiritual, things,” or as “one who studies, or 
is versed in, natural science.”7 This non-philosophical meaning can be traced back 
to the medieval Latin expression naturalista. Secondly, a naturalist is someone who 
believes in philosophical naturalism, which is characterized by the OED as “a view 
of the world, and of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation of natural (as 
opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or assumed.” Finally, 
in literary theory and the history of art, “naturalism” is a term for a certain style or 
epoch. Zola was a naturalist in the third sense of the word, Quine in the second, and 
Darwin in the first. Only naturalism in the second sense is a philosophical position. It 
is this second sense that this chapter addresses.
Naturalism in the first half of the century 
As a philosophical trend, naturalism has played a prominent role since the late 
nineteenth century. Of course, the term is older. Christian apologetics from the 
seventeenth century used it in a pejorative sense. Naturalists were labeled with the 
epithets “blasphemous” and “atheistic,” where a naturalist was simply someone who 
refused Christian supernaturalism. As quoted above from the OED, naturalists aimed 
to explain all phenomena with “the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural 
or spiritual) laws and forces.” Philosophical naturalism in the present sense of the 
word has been characterized thus: “The closest thing to a common core of meaning 
is probably the view that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to 
truth.”8 Understood in this sense, the term has been in use on a larger scale since 
the late nineteenth century. Unquestionably, Hobbes and Hume would today call 
themselves “naturalists,” and so would Holbach and LaMettrie. We have to keep in 
mind, however, that the geography of those debates was described in different terms. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, other -isms covered what is subsumed under 
“naturalism” today: materialism, mechanism, positivism, empiricism, and monism. 
